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I correct two misapprehensions, one historical and one conceptual, in the recent
literature on extensions of the Wigner’s Friend thought-experiment. Perhaps fit-
tingly, both concern the accurate description of some quantum physicists’ beliefs by
others.
This note is a response to Sudbery’s recent commentary [1] on an article by Frauchiger
and Renner [2], who propose an elaboration upon a thought-experiment named in honor of
Wigner [3]. With that intimidatingly scholastic sentence out of the way, we will first address
a bibliographical point and then proceed to more conceptual matters.
Sudbery’s paper uses a 2002 article by Caves, Fuchs and Schack [4] to define the interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics known as QBism. This is an incorrect attribution. That paper
contains much that is not QBist, and all three authors will say so [5]. QBism had not yet
clawed itself into being in 2002, nor even by 2007 [6]. QBism, as a term and an interpreta-
tion, did not hit the arXiv until 2009 [7, §8]. Moreover, Caves does not call himself a QBist
and disagrees with some turns that the other two authors made in the process of developing
the QBist interpretation. (One might call the Caves–Fuchs–Schack collaborations “Quan-
tum Bayesian” papers, that term being older and more general, encompassing some writings
of Bub and Pitowsky [8] and potentially even old Usenet posts of Baez [9], for example.)
Canonical presentations of QBism, in roughly increasing order of technicality, include von
Baeyer’s book [10]; Fuchs, Mermin and Schack’s article [11]; and Fuchs and Stacey’s long
review [12]. What these sources say about Wigner’s Friend applies to Frauchiger–Renner
and all the other recent variations thereof.
Nurgalieva and del Rio’s analysis of Frauchiger–Renner [13] also cites the 2002 paper of
Caves, Fuchs and Schack as QBist, but provides correct references in addition.
With that addressed, we move on. Sudbery gives the following paraphrase of Frauchiger
and Renner’s Assumption (Q):
If an agent A is certain that a system is in an eigenstate of an observable X with
eigenvalue ξ and time t0, and a measurement of X is completed at time t > t0,
then A is certain that the result x of the measurement is x = ξ at time t.
Sudbery asserts that QBism accepts this assumption (see his Table 1). This is incorrect; in
fact, QBism finds it ill-posed in multiple ways. First, a QBist would never say that a system
is “in” a quantum state, eigen- or otherwise. Any quantum state is an agent’s encoding of
their own expectations regarding a physical system. The system is not in a quantum state
any more than the Earth’s atmosphere is in a weather forecast. Therefore, a good QBist
agent would not be “certain that a system is in an eigenstate” of X; the agent’s choice of
a pure-state ascription is itself the expression of their certainty. This point also affects the
evaluation of how QBism responds to other statements, such as Sudbery’s Assumption (P).
Second, and more subtly, Assumption (Q) conflates statements applying to different
times. Let us say that at time t0, Alice ascribes the quantum state |ψ〉 to a physical
system of interest. If Alice lives up to the consistency standard known as quantum theory,
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2then she must consequently be maximally confident regarding the outcome of a specific
later measurement. At time t0, she fully expects that the von Neumann measurement X
completed at time t > t0 will have outcome ξ. This is a statement about her gambling
commitments at time t0, not what she might believe when time t finally arrives. There is
a crucial difference between “Alice is certain at time t that X will yield ξ” and “Alice is
certain at time t0 that she will be certain at a later time t that X will yield ξ”. For additional
discussion deliniating the qualitatively different things too often clumped together as “time
evolution”, see [14–16].
Here is Frauchiger and Renner’s version of Assumption (Q):
Suppose that agent A has established that
Statement A(i): “System S is in state |ψS〉 at time t0.”
Suppose furthermore that agent A knows that
Statement A(ii): “The value x is obtained by a measurement of S w.r.t.
the family {pit0x }x∈X of Heisenberg operators relative to time t0, which
is completed at time t.”
If 〈ψ|pit0ξ |ψ〉 = 1 for some ξ ∈ X then agent A can conclude that
Statement A(iii): “I am certain that x = ξ at time t.”
This version is more notationally elaborate, but as far as QBism is concerned, it shares the
same problems as Sudbery’s more succinct phrasing. There is an additional difficulty with
Frauchiger and Renner’s discussion:
Assumption (Q) corresponds to the quantum-mechanical Born rule. Since the
assumption is concerned with the special case of probability-1 predictions only,
it is largely independent of interpretational questions, such as the meaning of
probabilities in general.
QBism maintains that predictions made with p = 1 are still probabilistic predictions, just as
those with p = 0.99, or p = 0.999. This is an essential ingredient in the QBist take on the
EPR “paradox” and Bell inequalities [11, 12]. Statement A(iii) in Assumption (Q) appears
to play the role of the EPR criterion of reality, namely attempting to infer pre-existing
physical reality from p = 1 predictions, a move that QBism finds inadmissable. Whether
or not one accepts this position, the fact is that it exists in the spectrum of foundational
debate, and taking it on board affects the validity of conclusions one might attempt to draw.
Thus, restricting one’s argument to probability-1 predictions does not make one’s desired
conclusion “largely independent” of the interpretation of probability. The question of how to
interpret probability theory is too fundamental to be sidestepped in this manner. Trying to
do so is like saying, “We discuss only the colors black and white, so our logic is independent
of questions about visual perception.”
Consequently, the row about QBism in Frauchiger and Renner’s Table 4 is in error.
Further examination and exegesis are possible [16]. For example, the question of inter-
preting probability-1 statements is a good jumping-off point to understand the divergence
between the Caves–Fuchs–Schack collaborations and QBism proper [17]. However, this com-
ment is already long enough.
I thank Frauchiger and Renner for bringing the old riddle of Wigner’s Friend into the
limelight, and I also extend my gratitude to del Rio, Nurgalieva and Sudbery for taking on
3the typically thankless task of articulating assumptions otherwise left unstated. Moreover,
I have had helpful conversations and correspondence with Gabriela Barreto Lemos, Carlton
Caves, John B. DeBrota, Christopher Fuchs, Jacques Pienaar and Rüdiger Schack.
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